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Abstract Human life consists of stability interspersed with
ruptures. Transitions that follow such ruptures, offer a window on
processes of change at the level of skill acquisition, identities, but
also meaning construction. The article explores various uses of
cultural elements such as books, movies or religious baggage as
symbolic resources for such psychological development. It
introduces the notion of interiority to have access to the work of
these symbolic resources on emotions. Such uses of symbolic
resources are examined through a study of the procedure of
choosing first names during the transition to parenthood. The
notion of symbolic competencies, as the abilities to use cultural
elements as resources for thinking, action and development, is
proposed to account for interpersonal differences and is discussed.
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Symbolic Competencies for Developmental Transitions:
The Case of the Choice of First Names
Transition periods in a life-time are periods that follow events that have
put at stake certain routines or taken-for-granted situations; such events
can be seen as ruptures in the regular flow of one’s experience. In adult
life, transitions can follow a person’s inner changes, some changes in
his or her surroundings, or his or her relocation in other surroundings
(change of profession, moving country); transitions can also follow
wider societal events. Hence such ruptures call for processes of reposi-
tioning, and can invite new acquisitions, understandings and personal
redefinitions. In that sense, transitions in adult life are occasions for
development. During transitions, people might use symbolic elements
as resources, as we have shown elsewhere (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie,
Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003). The argument which is discussed more
thoroughly in this paper explores a particular zone of the problematic:
when a person uses symbolic resources in a transition period, he or she
does not only act upon his or her interpersonal, material and symbolic
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surroundings, but also modifies his or her ‘inner’ life. After defining
the model in which I am working, I will explore ‘hidden’ meaning
construction processes occurring in one’s interiority and linked to the
use of symbolic resources as a possible contribution to an adult socio-
cultural psychology of development.
Apprehending the Uses of Symbolic 
Resources in Transition
Cultural psychologies have contributed to our understanding of the
developing person. Different approaches and theoretical orientations
coincide in the acknowledgement of the social and cultural frames of
the person as ‘constitutive’ of their thinking and activity (Bruner, 1996;
Carugati & Perret-Clermont, 1999). The notion of ‘personal culture’
helps to identify the unique result of internalization or re-appropriation
of available meanings with which people get acquainted through their
interaction with people and semiotic objects (Tomasello, 1999;
Toomela, 1996; Valsiner, 1998); personal cultures offer a basis for action
and thought. Studies have shown that people do not only internalize
and re-appropriate these symbolic elements that circulate and consti-
tute the social spaces and the interactions in which they are engaged,
but that in this process they may also contribute to these symbolic
worlds by way of externalization (Valsiner, 1998).
In line with our previous work (Zittoun et al., 2003), this paper is
located in a theoretical frame that admits the socio-cultural location of
the person as a subject. It considers the person within symbolic worlds,
but also the person as an active chooser and user of cultural elements
as symbolic resources. Focusing on the role of the person within certain
constraints, we have shown that she might ‘choose’, more or less
reflectively, cultural elements in her socio-cultural environment or in
her personal cultures as possible tools to act upon things. Cultural
elements are complex symbolic constellations, such as objects or rites
within family, religious or national traditions, which are shared
diachronically, or such as books, novels or paintings, which are made
out of organizations of semiotic units within discrete objects, synchron-
ically available in a given society. Both types of cultural elements have
a material substratum, and, in that sense, have a historical continuity,
carrying once-encapsulated meanings beyond the fact that these are
objects of ever-renewed reading or watching.
Cultural elements can be internalized and memorized; however,
when they are ‘used’ to do something—to act upon social realities, to
modify one’s understanding—they become ‘instruments’ (as, for
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example, in Vygotsky, 1930/1978, or in Winnicott, 1971/2001). To
emphasize the active role of a person, we have called them ‘symbolic
resources’. Symbolic resources are cultural elements which are mobil-
ized by a person in a situation not related to the situation of their inter-
nalization, and which the person uses as means in order to do
something (Zittoun, 2001b, in press).
An interesting issue is how a specific person will, in a given situ-
ation, choose one of the possible instruments at his or her disposal, and
use it to solve the situation at hand. That instrument might be more or
less efficient in that situation, and can be handled with more or less
mastery. Phrasing the question of symbolic activity in terms of ‘uses’
confers some importance to personal agency. It gives less emphasis to
the relationship between a person and given cultural elements at the
internalization phase, and more to the next moment—when these are
re-mobilized and used in thought and action (of which externalizations
might be one variation).
The outcomes of uses of symbolic resources can be various—these
can be observed at the level of microgenesis of meaning, where their
semiotic components might participate in processes of thought and
emotion regulation (Valsiner, 2001). However, in cultural elements,
semiotic components are organized and structured; their potential
meaning content and transformative power results from their organ-
ized totality (Vygotsky, 1928/1971), and a person’s interpretation of
these, while infinite, is nevertheless constrained by this organization.
Finally, as these are always socially, culturally and historically situated,
their use might produce additional effects due to such connotations.
Hence symbolic resources might have consequences not only for what
the person intended to act upon or to do with the cultural element (what
was consciously looked for), due to the many layers of symbolic func-
tioning of such elements. These effects nevertheless come out of inten-
tional uses of symbolic resources.1
Hence, the metaphor of ‘uses of symbolic resources’ offers a theor-
etical standpoint from which to examine various modalities of uses of
cultural elements, their intended and unexpected outcomes, and skills
these uses require. Uses of symbolic resources in challenging situations
may lead the person to develop new skills and understandings.
Additionally, as will be shown in this paper, such repositioning and
changes might be expressed by means of new symbolic creations.
However, one question stays open in such a formulation: what
happens between picking and grasping an available cultural element
and being able to use it, and expressing new symbolic forms? What
occurs between internalization and externalization? How can we detail
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such movements, in a way that allows us to have a grasp on the inter-
personal variation in how people use symbolic resources? In this paper,
I will address this issue by exploring the implication of such uses
within a person’s interiority.
Transition in the Life-Course
A period of transition in a life-time is a period in which a certain
number of taken-for-granted representations, understandings, routines
or identities are put at stake. Produced by a simple translation in the
social field, by a rupture in the social or societal world or by an inner
move (Duveen, 1998; Erikson, 1975; Moscovici, 1973), a transition
always supposes a socio-cultural relocation (Benson, 2001). Transition
periods are particularly interesting candidates for examining emerging
psychological changes: they might disrupt equilibrium, catalyse
psychological processes or induce rearrangement, and thus offer
natural laboratories for psychological development (Zittoun et al.,
2003). A transition might not always be perceived as such by indi-
viduals (Grob, 2001; Lindenberger & Baltes, 2000); but some activities,
linked to meaning construction, might indeed reveal that a person
is dealing with a perceived transition, and engaged in processes of
change.
Numerous studies have examined cognitive and social resources
that might facilitate aspects of changes during transitions, and
especially during youth. These studies have usually examined three
types of changes for which resources are required (Perret-Clermont &
Zittoun, 2002). These are linked to one’s ability to act in the material
and social world, and to reflect upon the social and the inner world.
Since this division covers the possible uses of symbolic resources, and
since these fields have been documented, I will use this analytical
division through my paper. The three types of change are as follows:
1. The development and acquisition of specific social, practical and
theoretical skills and knowledge, allowing someone to act, to
communicate, to be legitimized, to behave and to think in a new
position (Carugati, 2004; Heath, 1996, 2004; Perret & Perret-
Clermont, 2001; Roulleau-Berger, 1991).
2. The redefinition of identities, involving the construction and mobiliz-
ation of representation of oneself in the past, and of possible selves
in a future at a given socio-cultural location. These representations
draw on personal memories and socio-cultural representations,
modulated by specific locations. Redefinitions are limited by one’s
sense of personal consistency and continuity.
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3. The construction of a personal meaning of the transition itself and its
components, and the inscription of this meaning in a general, not
necessarily verbal, personal narrative. Such meanings require an
elaboration of partly unconscious, emotional and bodily prolonga-
tions of one’s experience. Meaning and emotional elaborations are
the conditions for new learning or identity definitions; put in a
meaningless situation, a person can have his or her thinking
abilities inhibited (Aumont & Mesnier, 1992; Moscovici, 1994; Paín,
1981/1985, 1985).
Transitions allow us to envisage development as processes of changes
at one, or more, of these three intermeshed levels. But change can take
various forms, of which only some are developmental; a transition
period is only an occasion for development (Lindenberger & Baltes,
2000). What, then, is a ‘good’, developmental, outcome of a transition,
and what is a change which is not ‘developmental’? Any affirmation
regarding development involves a normative stance, and here I will try
to clarify mine. To say that a transition is developmental implies that
a person can leave the position he or she occupied before, and, on the
basis of previous skills and/or knowledge, generate ways of thinking
or acting which prepare him or her to find a pathway through uncer-
tainty toward a new regularity. Its success supposes a double acknow-
ledgement: by the environment, that is, recognition by others and a
correspondence to the changed situation (the new actions or thought
‘work’); and by oneself. On one side, it implies more than maintaining
ways of doing and thinking that are now out-of-date, or more than
radically adjusting to the requirements of a new given situation. It
always requires the mobilization of something (a skill, a knowledge)
that has been useful in the past to be transformed, re-composed or used
in a radically new way. It might thus involve much trial and error, or
many random explorations—it needs some time and space (i.e. the
transition). On the other side, there is indeed a sense of being the same
through the change that the person has to maintain; a change that
‘works’ might alienate a person from him- or herself and would hence
be a ‘bad’ change. Yet too much fidelity to one’s former self might
alienate a person from the requirements of a new situation. Hence a
flexible space for change is needed, where a ‘good enough change’ has
to be found between maintaining pasts and creating newness. Each
person’s flexibility has a limit: unbearable psychic pain.
If symbolic resources can be used for psychological development
during a transition period, they do so as part of this dynamic of
mobilizing known ways of thinking, acting or representing in a new
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fashion that is oriented toward the unknown. The metaphor of ‘uses’
of something by someone during a transition hence implies that
someone can or cannot use, or can become an expert at choosing
elements that can be turned into symbolic resources for a develop-
mental outcome of the transition. In a developmental perspective, this
might of course raise questions linked to ‘competence’ of symbolic
uses, and thus have some heuristic interest that I will consider in the
last section of this paper.
Interiority
When a person is said to experience a rupture and to engage in a
process of change, this person needs to be defined in a way that gives
room to describe the processes of uses of symbolic means through
which he or she might be repositioned (toward others, within a given
social field), through which he or she thinks and learns, and through
which he or she experiences various meanings and their related
feelings. If we were only to care about his or her abilities to act upon
the world, we could talk about a person as a locus of action; however,
we have just précised that the change might be experienced as such,
thought of or felt. How are we then to designate the locus of the inter-
nalization of meanings encapsulated in shared cultural elements,
where these become enough ‘one’s own’ so as to determine one’s ways
of thinking and feeling, of producing meanings and of externalizing
them, or of acting in the world?
Such a location is often designated as the ‘subjectivity’ of the
person—being understood as one’s location within socio-cultural or
interpersonal networks. This location results out of a person’s biogra-
phy, moves in the field of social interactions and of symbolic streams,
influences and resistances, internalizations and externalizations
(Benson, 2001; Duveen, 2001; Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997). The notion
of ‘subjectivity’ carries its opposition to ‘objectivity’—which is usually
understood as designing the opposition between ‘real’ and ‘non-real’.
However, if we take seriously the symbolic construction of the mind,
or that cultural elements need minds to be made sense of, this distinc-
tion falls. As proposed earlier, symbolic elements have an incon-
testable, material substratum—a book, a song or a CD have a ‘real’
existence. They start to become organizers or meaning, feeling or action
once they have been read or listened to by someone (the ‘cultural
experience’—Zittoun, 2003b). The organization of sensual, emotional,
visual and cognitive experience this allows is unique for each reader
or listener—it is made of the stuff of his or her body, memories and
emotions; and this, incontestably, is as much ‘real’ (even if it has
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another form of material substratum). The location of the experience of
the person must thus be localized differently. Theoretically, the notions
of internalization and externalization designate the dynamics of inte-
grating shared meaning and structures in a socialized mind, and of
producing new symbolically mediated meanings that might affect the
social world. What we try to designate here is a moment ‘between’
these two dynamics (Valsiner, 1998). Additionally, our phenomeno-
logical experience tells us that if books, churches and CDs exist in the
shared world ‘out there’, interacting with such objects provokes some-
thing that must be said to exist ‘in here’ (what I feel and see when I
listen to a song). It thus seems that a spatial metaphor allows to desig-
nate, or expand, that sequence of an ongoing loop of meanings. This
space can thus be designated as ‘interior’, as opposed to an ‘exterior’
symbolic element (result of externalizations) that exists as a material,
immobile, non-experienced object. I thus call ‘interiority’ the space
where symbolic processes are mingled with a given person’s experi-
ence, or where symbolic elements re-deploy their contents and
organization while re-composing a person’s memories. The notion of
interiority thus specifies the nature of Vygotsky’s description of
cultural experiences: in his papers on poetry and on play he suggested
that symbolic means open spaces to contain and transform feelings and
explore possible experiences (Vygotsky, 1928/1971, 1931/1994). ‘Inte-
riority’ thus metaphorically designates this space, where an imaginary
experience is possible, thanks to the encounter between what the
symbolic element, coming from the social and cultural world,
proposes, and the fabric of one’s memories, emotions and fantasies. It
is where Harry Potter becomes ‘my’ Harry Potter, and where my
memories of Italy are re-presented to me as I read A Room with a View.
On one side, interiority is revealed by social, material symbolic
realities, such as signs on a page or pictures on a film, designating
shared socio-cultural entities. On the other side, these cultural elements
allow someone to explore private imaginary spaces, where the truth-
judgement is suspended: to ‘see’ a kind of internal movie when reading
a book, to feel movements and emotions when listening to a song, or
to feel modified once the last line of a poem just read finishes resonat-
ing (Grodal, 1997; Lázló, 1999; Lévi-Strauss, 1971/1990; Vygotsky,
1928/1971).
As indicated above, uses of symbolic resources might enable any of
these three types of changes linked to a transition that we have just
indicated. Defining interiority in such terms allows us to locate the
third type of changes—the construction of meanings. Considering
‘interiority’ and what it ‘feels like’ to have a Harry Potter or a Verdi
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experience also gives us a stance from which to consider why a person
chooses this or that cultural element to orient his or her location, to
initiate or refrain from such an action, and for what outcome. The
notion of ‘interiority’ thus brings us to examine the meeting of the
collective and the personal, enabled by a person’s choices of cultural
elements, at given moments. It also proposes examining what is
‘between’ internalizing and externalizing, ‘between’ one’s encounter
with symbolic streams and one’s socially visible repositioning or action.
Moving to the study of processes occurring where ‘interiority’ has
just been defined implies a change of theoretical perspective, and for
this I will adopt other conceptual tools. In effect, socio-cultural
psychology has only marginally addressed symbolic elaborations
going on ‘within’ the person, or the cultural fabric of imagination and
its emotional implications. On the other hand, psychoanalytical
approaches have examined the processes of change and transformation
enabled at the level of interiority through uses of symbolic-cultural
means, as well as the link between affects and symbolization processes.
I will thus draw on some of their theoretical tools, and, to ground the
coming discussion, I will briefly present some of the propositions of
such a framework.
Linking Affects and Memories, Symbols and Futures
In his synthesis of current post-Freudian psychoanalytic research,
Green (1973/1992a, 2002) develops the Freudian metaphoric model
of the ‘psychic apparatus’, where affects—rather than emotions—
provoked by internal or external events, designate the dynamic,
working aspects of drives. These are the ‘embodied’, non-conscious
part of our emotional experiences. Out of this embodiment, affects
diffuse through different layers of the psyche—from the body, to the
unconscious, to the preconscious, from which they eventually reach
consciousness. Along this journey, embodied affects can be connected
to representation of things (mnemonic traces), and these can progres-
sively be linked to the representation of words (or symbolic means
allowing reflectivity). The latter can eventually emerge in conscious-
ness through symbolic forms. Affects can be dangerous for the produc-
tion of thought if they subsist without being attached to any
representations, and, therefore, if they stay unacknowledged as such.
Non-linked, they can become cleaved, like in the case of trauma, or
they can be discharged through acting-out or somatization. Once an
affect is linked to a representation and dynamizes it, the affect-and-
representation can be repressed, or transformed to be consciously
tolerable, and this can in turn modify deeper memories. Affects can
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also be seen as signals emerging in the consciousness of such psychic
movements (Green, 2002). On this basis, symbolization can be seen as
the double linkage of, on one side, images and not-yet conscious
psychic emotional events, and, on the other side, forms of symbolic,
shareable manifestation (gesture, graphic, verbal), before becoming the
object of a reflective loop. Affects that remain unlinked are susceptible
to having indirect effects on one’s chain of representational or symbolic
means, and, in general, might disturb thought. In the case of trauma,
whole zones of thought might be distorted—so as to avoid a given
topic; in less pathological cases, un-symbolized affects can simply
make irruptions in one’s behaviour, perception or flow of discourse. In
that sense, cultural experiences as experienced in one’s interiority
provoke or awaken memories and affects; but they also, simul-
taneously, offer symbolic forms to contain and re-present these
memories or affects in a symbolic form; these can thus be re-appre-
hended as if they came from the outside, and the work of linking and
transforming affects in one’s thought might be facilitated. However, as
we will see, such symbolic facilitations are not always the case.
The notions explored here allow us to focus on a person constituting
a socio-cultural given semiotic constellation (a cultural element) into
something relevant for him or her at a given point in time and space,
and turning it into a symbolic resource. They allow us to examine in
parallel the effects of uses of symbolic resources in the shared world
and in the interiority of the person, before such uses eventually modify
the person’s relationship to the shared world.
Defining a Situation of Transition, and a Methodological
Access to Symbolic Processes
Of course, it might be difficult to define methodological approaches to
observe the effect of uses of symbolic resources in a person’s interior-
ity. One possible way is to try to define ‘natural’ situations of tran-
sitions involving necessarily some symbolic work. In other words, we
need to have access to a given person’s personal culture, and to the
result of his or her uses of symbolic elements.
To approach this matter, I will examine one particular transition, the
transition to parenthood, with a special focus on the choice of first
names for the coming child (Zittoun, 2001b). Aiming to contribute to
our understanding of transition periods in general, I will follow the
analytical distinction proposed above. The transition to parenthood
indeed involves skill acquisitions, identity changes and meaning
construction, and has emotional and unconscious prolongations. A
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developmental outcome of the transition to parenthood involves
constructing a representation of the child to come, in the future, and of
oneself as the parent of that child (Ammaniti & Stern, 1991). Such a
representation will guide a lot of ‘parental’ activities. These construc-
tions, implying one’s reactivation of memories of one’s own childhood
and relationships to one’s own parents, might awaken important
affective loads and, in some cases, unconscious conflicting themes
(Bydlowski, 1997). A symbolic, crystallized, observable outcome of the
symbolic work going on at that time is the first name chosen for a
newborn.
The study of symbolic dynamics linked to this transition is facilitated
by the study of the procedures of choosing first names. This symbolic
task indeed implies psychological processes connected to what can be
distinguished as four symbolic functions of first names. First, names
can be seen as signs of group or identity belonging. Second, they desig-
nate imaginary spaces, such as the fantasy, hopes, imagination, associ-
ated with a name, both in collective representation and in personal
imaginaries. Third, names are symbolic objects with a sound, a rhythm,
and a shape that can have bodily and affective prolongations. Fourth,
they also might be associated with projects, or future representations
of the child. Examining people’s discourse regarding these levels of
meaning associated to first names offers an access to the three layers
of change processes identified above, and also to their represen-
tations of the future. Choosing first names implies, at the first level,
subjective locations or re-positions of a person as a parent of a given
child; in turn these relocations are linked with the parent’s identity
and his competencies as a parent. The second and third aspects, the
imaginary and the sensual ones, are connected with a person’s interi-
ority. The fourth aspect shows us how a person, giving a name to a
child, elaborates a future representation of the child and of herself as a
parent and can thus give an indication of developmental outcomes of
the transition.
The methodology chosen for this study is based on an attempt to
reconstruct people’s choices and uses of symbolic resources in a
decision-making process (choosing a name) triggered by a ‘real-life’
transition. Forty semi-structured reconstructive interviews were
conducted with parents, alone or in couples, three or four months after
the birth of a child, about the procedure of choosing a name. The inter-
views were done after the choices, for theoretical and ethical reasons.
First, given the fact that first names are chosen not at a given time and
space, but sometimes even before the conception of a child, and given
that the procedure of choices is distributed among an infinity of
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moments (walking in a public space, listening to music, dreaming,
etc.), to question people during the transition would not guarantee
catching the ‘real’ procedure of choice. Second, the reflectivity
provoked by such interviews might strongly influence the procedure
of choice, and, for ethical reasons, it seemed incorrect to let the research
potentially have a long-term influence on the parent–child relationship.
Third, if a post-hoc interview implies rationalization, it asks people to
mobilize their symbolic resources. Even if these are not the ones that
were used at the time of the choice, we still have access to a given
person’s uses of symbolic resources. Interviews were effectuated both
with mothers and with couples, for two reasons: first, the interviewee
was offered the choice to be alone or in couple, so that they would feel
comfortable; second, pilot interviews had shown that couples tend to
talk about issues of negotiations, procedures and socio-cultural loca-
tions, whereas mothers by themselves tend to develop issues linked to
personal and emotional life, uses of symbolic resources and interiority.
The parents, out of a group contacted in a large Swiss town by way of
their birth announcements in the newspaper, came from different social
classes and cultural backgrounds; all of them spoke fluent French, the
medium of the interviews.
The interviews included questions related to their choice procedure
(names evoked but rejected, naming practices in use by their families),
representations of the child, and the cultural elements mobilized
through the name choice procedure. Notes were taken on the setting of
the interview. The taped interviews were fully transcribed, and the tran-
scription was verified by graduate students. The data were submitted
to four types of analysis aiming at identifying the three level of changes
of a transition: a content analysis documented procedures of choices
and negotiations (‘what’s in a name’); some case-analysis allowed a
tracing of individual decision procedures, couple negotiations and
identity dynamics; a quantitative analysis allowed exploration of the
link between future-oriented representations and uses of traditional
resources; and finally an ‘interpretative analysis’ was done to identify
processes at the level of interiority (this method will be specified later).
Naming a Child and the Uses of Symbolic 
Resources for Development
Symbolic objects are complex realities, and acting with or upon them
might have many consequences as these have prolongations in the
interpersonal, ideological, social, material, internal worlds. Parents
intend to find names for their children; on the basis of the method just
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discussed, I will show how they can use cultural elements, both
traditional and mass-mediated, as symbolic resources for the tran-
sitions they live through.
The question of uses of symbolic resources for defining first names
is specific to certain types of occidental, modern societies, where indi-
viduals are, in principle, free to define repertoires of names for their
child, rules of composition of the names (first, middle, surname), and
independent from ritualized naming ceremonies. In other forms of
societies, naming procedures are, or have been, heavily regulated. First
names indicate a child’s group or familial belonging, classify him or
her within the order of generations, and link him or her to specific
meanings for the group’s global Weltanschauung (Alford, 1987; Lévi-
Strauss, 1962/1985; Zonabend, 1980). The slow decomposition of such
‘traditional’ ways of naming, although not homogeneous (neither
geographically nor socially) (see Besnard, 1995; Jouniaux, 1999; Lieber-
son, 1995; Lieberson & Bell, 1992; Rabinovich, Pereira Hulle-Coser,
Trovaglini, & Esteves et al., 1994), has accompanied the progressive
abandonment of the powerful symbolic systems that once structured
the visible and the visible world and its events in shared, meaningful
ways (Geertz, 1966). One of the consequence of the loss of such
comprehensive, available resources within given groups is that people
have to choose among a much wider range of possible and often
incompatible cultural elements when trying to elaborate their own
worldview.
I will briefly present uses of symbolic resources that facilitate
choosing first names, and uses that result in identity relocation (for
similar uses of symbolic resources, see Zittoun et al., 2003). More atten-
tion will be given to the level of meaning construction and emotional
elaboration in one’s interiority.
Symbolic Resources for Learning and Resolving Tasks
A concrete task to solve during the transition to parenthood is finding
a name for the coming child. It sometimes confronts the future parents
with an extraordinary bewilderment, because they want names fitting
complex and contradicting streams of requirements. They think about
the signs of group, national, religious belonging they want others to
see or not to see in the first name. They think about associations desig-
nated by the name, both personal (memories, tastes), and socially
shared representations or cultural meanings. They evaluate first names
as objects of the senses, with sound, taste and shape, and care about
how they will fit with surnames or other names in the family. They
imagine the child, or themselves as the parent of a girl called so-and-so.
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They make projects of cultural transmission related to the cultural
connotation of the first names. And they use all sorts of beliefs and
shared representations about what should be a first name and how to
find the ‘right’ one (it seems that it has to be a ‘flash’ of inspiration, a
‘coup de foudre’). The chosen first name will thus ‘crystallize’ these
different levels of meaning and will be at the junction of internal
elaborations, requirements, and in statu nascendi representations
(Moscovici, 1997, 1999) and social and cultural influences and deter-
minations.
There are some social, pragmatic and cultural aids to define a
procedure of naming and a repertoire of possible names for a child.
First, there are cultural ‘heuristics’ of choice such as making ‘hit
parades’ or a lottery of chosen names. Cultural traditions offer heuris-
tics such as fixing where the names should come from (father’s father,
deceased parents, godmothers, etc.). Social mediation, such as
discussing with parents or friends, can facilitate these heuristics.
Second, artefacts such as first-name books, web pages, family trees or
movie credits offer symbolic resources for the constitution of ‘reper-
toires’ (collections of possible names fitting some requirements). The
repertoire can be limited by aesthetic criteria (‘round’ sound, meaning-
ful initials such as ‘LOV’), or pragmatic ones (‘John Smith is common,
but not with a second name, such as John Eleazar Smith’). Finally, these
cultural, social, mediative resources for the name choice allow a person
to explore possible worlds, to imagine the coming child, or to get used
to the idea of the coming child. Some parents try to write cards, and
announcements, as if the child was there, and called so-and-so. These
various resources contribute to confer on first names their various
symbolic functions.
Symbolic Resources for Identity Redefinition
Future parents are generally aware of the social and cultural dimen-
sions of the first names, and have to define what ‘sort’ of child they
want to be the parent of. Moreover, mobilizing familial naming prin-
ciples and repertoires, they examine their own identity-roots. Choosing
a name is therefore a moment of mobilization of the representation of
oneself in the past, as having carried a given identity, and of oneself in
the future, as parent of the coming-growing child. It can be the moment
to decide whether given identities’ anchorages will be maintained,
modified or refused.
In mixed or migrant couples, two traditions are salient: that of the
parent, and his or her partner; and that of the context. Normal identity
negotiations are highlighted and classical strategies can be observed
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(see, e.g., Barbara, 1993; Hassoun, 1995; Varro, 1995). First, parents can
choose one and abandon the other anchorage: for example, if the
mother is Italian and the father French, the child might have a French
first name. Second, they can find first names that fit both cultures—in
the same example, Eva would be accepted as being both a French and
an Italian name. Third, they can find first names exterior to these—in
the same case, ‘Kevin’ is chosen because it is ‘American’ (neither Italian
nor French). Fourth, the parents can meta-define the culture and
traditions involved: for example, when one parent is Christian and the
other Jewish, they can redefine their belonging as ‘people from the
Bible’ and name the child after the Old Testament, such as ‘Jonathan’.
A closer analysis reveals that these negotiations rarely exhaust the
identity regulation processes. Second names, forgotten or eliminated
names often carry important identity dimensions too (in the first
example, for example, the ‘rejected’ mother’s Italian origin can be
hidden in an Italian middle name). Given or evoked names appear to
express given steps in one’s re-positioning process in some streams of
cultural representations, but also contain, hide or designate the conflict
which arises due to these relocation processes. These unformulated
conflicts sometimes have secondary effects at the level of meaning
construction and emotional elaboration, as we will see below.
A parent can decide to have a child who will become a certain type
of adult, either similar to or different from what he or she is. A particu-
lar education will have to be given to the child by the parent. If the
parents do not have the relevant identity-related knowledge, they may
have to learn or acquire it, which often means changing their identity
(Duveen, 2001; Hundeide, 2004). For instance, an atheist mother,
willing to give a Catholic education to her child, will have to prepare
a Christmas crib, and, therefore, act as a Christian person—which
means that she develops an identity project including an identity-
transformation.
Through this mobilization of representation of oneself in the past
and the imagination of possible, parenthood future selves, the name
choice procedure is thus related to identity redefinitions and reloca-
tions. In that sense, the procedure for choosing a first name mediates
a certain developmental process, similar to the processes implied by
adolescence (Josephs, 1997, 1998; Kraus, 1996; Tap & Malewska-Peyre,
1991). Here, these processes imply a stronger sense of negotiation with
a partner and a stronger time-orientation than adolescence, at a
biographical level and with past and future generations.
The procedure itself sustains elaboration processes, since it always
requires mobilizing social representations and cultural elements related
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to different assigned or chosen identities. These representations,
cultural systems and elements can have a role in the scaffolding or the
re-shaping of that process. For instance, people whose discourses
evoke mainly familial traditions, stories and rites, principles and reper-
toires (also to refuse them) are more likely, on average, to develop a
clear and consistent representation of the coming child and themselves
in the future.2 By contrast, people who mobilize fewer traditional
elements, instead giving emotional and aesthetic reasons for their
choices, are more likely to have an unclear, emotionally overwhelmed
discourse with an absence of representation of themselves as parents
(Zittoun, 2001b). Such tendencies may be explained by the fact that
persons having an awareness of traditions (even to refuse to carry them
on) confront the strong, inherent time-reorientation of any ‘cultural
baggage’, the narrative they carry (about the genealogy, the group,
historical or mythical) and the procedural and heuristic skills they
transmit. Note that some cases escape such tendencies. All in all, these
facilitations in identity-re-elaboration processes may be understood as
being underpinned by meaning-construction processes.
Symbolic Resources for Meaning Construction 
and Elaboration of Experience
Meaning constructions presuppose an elaboration of the emotional,
bodily and unconscious prolongations of the experiences due to a tran-
sition period. In the case of the transition to parenthood, this has
particularly been highlighted through perinatal studies and the
research on early interactions (Bydlowski, 1997; Bydlowski & Candilis,
1998; Mazet & Lebovici, 1998; Stern, 1995). These researches have
shown that people are actively engaged in the elaboration of three
partly unconscious questions. One regards intergenerational relation-
ships: becoming a parent means that instead of being defined as a child
of one’s parent, the person now becomes a parent. This pushes, at least
symbolically, the parent’s parents to the side of ageing person, and,
possibly, death—and confronts oneself with one’s own future ageing
process. Second, sex differences are obviously actualized during preg-
nancy; one’s relationships to one’s own gender and to the partner’s are
questioned. Third, the person is confronted with questions that can
provoke anxieties, such as the mystery of the origin of life, unbearable
future deaths, or risks of sicknesses and handicaps. Finally, people will
have to deal with the tensions, ambivalences or latent conflicts
provoked through learning or identity re-elaborations.
As proposed, since we know that people cannot rely anymore on
generalized meaning systems to deal with such tensions (cf., Kaës,
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1996; Nathan, 1991), we have to examine how individuals use symbolic
resources that they mobilize out of their ‘personal culture’ and to see
if, and how, this allows them to work through these experiences. Note
that here it is assumed that the meaning people find in given cultural
elements cannot be reduced to interpretations obtained through any
textual or discourse analysis of the cultural element itself (see also
Anderson, Huston, Schmitt, Lineburger, & Wright, 2001; Lembo, 2000).
Such uses of symbolic resources would hence belong to phenomena
located in one’s interiority.
Practically, these processes can’t be observed. On the basis of the
previous theoretical assumptions and the particular object of inquiry,
I developed a method of ‘interpretative analysis’ (Zittoun, 2001b).
This interpretative analysis constructs and combines three layers of
meaning.3 First, it looks at a person’s various externalizations at a
given moment and place. In the discourse, it examines emotional
loads associated to various themes, on the basis of different cues—
redundancies and contradiction within the form or the content, at the
phonological or semantic level. It also considers other means of
symbolic expression—one’s choices of clothes, objects in one’s house,
destination of holiday, first names that have been envisaged or
rejected—that can confirm or contradict the saliency of themes
identified in one’s verbal expressions. In the case of this population,
the analysis is guided by the literature on the transition to parenthood,
in order to identify the difficulties that parents address. Second, the
person’s life-story regarding a given issue—here, naming—is recon-
structed. Third, these life-stories, and the emotional highlights, are
compared at the semantic and structural level with the cultural
element mentioned by the person; hypotheses are made about the
resonance that the latter might have had for a person. This method
does not, however, try to understand or to ‘interpret’ in a clinical sense
the origin of the emotional issues inferred through cues in one’s
discourse.
To explore the developmental work of symbolic resources in a
person’s interiority I will examine the contrasting uses of symbolic
resources by two mothers—different symbolic functions of similar
cultural elements are mobilized. These two cases are presented as
exemplars; they are two illustrations of tendencies emerging in all the
cases, and their interpretation is corroborated by the four analyses
mentioned in the previous section.
Let us first consider the mother of Arthur and Camille. These two
children both have two middle names, referring to the two parental
families, Catholic and Muslim, and intended to be signs of their 
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high-class belonging. The mother’s discourse is consistent and reflex-
ive; it loses its clarity, and appears overwhelmed by emotions only on
specific points. First, several cues indicate that it seems hard for her to
define how to be a woman in her virile, conservative, professional
environments. She rejects some representations of femininity, such as
some ‘dirtiness’ and weakness or vulnerability; she looks for gender-
ambivalent first names. On the other hand, her models of women, who
are Camille, Claudel, Cassandre, take on a strong sensual, passionate,
mystic femininity. She seems to try defining a way of being a Christ-
ian, warrior and mother, androgynous and passionate woman. Second,
she seems to have an ambivalent relationship to her husband’s Muslim
family—she both does not acknowledge it, and acknowledges it by
giving third Muslim names to the children. Other women have similar
conflicts, notably in relationship to their femininity. In some cases,
these ambivalences are strong enough to invade the whole discourse
and to prevent the parent elaborating positive representations of the
coming child. Here, conflicts seem sufficiently well elaborated for this
not to happen.
How can the mother of Arthur and Camille be said to have used
symbolic resources for that elaboration? One of the cultural elements
this woman mentions and values is the Avalon series of Marion
Zimmer-Bradley’s novels that she reread during her pregnancies.
Arthur is the hero of the series—an adaptation of the Arthurian myths.
At the heart of the narration is a royal line in a period of political
trouble. The plots are mainly related to the fact that the families and
every single character have to position themselves in a field of tensions:
oppositions between a dark, old religion, close to witchcraft, including
magic and supernatural power, vs. Christianity, rational, pure, light;
compulsory alliances vs. chosen loves (often forbidden ones); compro-
mise to socio-political and familial pressure vs. loyalty to one’s inner
truth and destiny. Guinevere is the wife of Arthur. Fair-haired, Christ-
ian and pure, she hides her love for Lancelot, connected to the old
religion. In order to smother her passion, she persuades her husband
to start a war against the old religion, too close to her desire. Her
religion becomes rigid and devout and she forces herself to love her
husband, but fails in giving him a son that could continue the line. On
the other side, Morgan is a fairy-woman; small and dark-haired, she
has been initiated to the antic religion of Avalon. She revolts against
this fairy life and engages in terrestrial loves, such as with Arthur.
Arthur is chained to his royal fate, but is the father of Morgan’s child.
In order to please his wife Guinevere, he will renounce all contacts to
this Old World.
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If we compare what we know of that woman’s life and that narra-
tive, resemblances appear at the semantic and structural levels. In the
tale and in ‘real life’, the hero-women belong to socially important
Christian lines, and are aware of their responsibilities in their continu-
ations. Some of the difficulties not explicitly formulated by the young
woman are discussed and unfurled in the narrative, such as the idea
that the obscure origin of the husband could be a danger against which
Christianity has to be imposed, or the two conflicting aspects of femi-
ninity (pure Christianity and darker desires), which are split onto two
characters.
Thus there is a resonance between life and tale (Kaës, 1998; László,
1999), based on similarities at the level of the plot, the content, and
some quality of feelings. It could be said that the Arthurian story offers
possible representations and amplifications of relevant problematics
for this woman. In this perspective, thanks to this resonance, the narra-
tion elected by the woman creates in her interiority containers for
unformulated ideas, takes in strong ambivalent feelings, and unpack
these ‘knots’ in narrative lines. According to a psychoanalytical
perspective, narratives such as folktales allow an excorporation of
some personal, internal unelaborated experiences, memories, feelings,
thanks to identification processes; some internal aspects are thus
distributed among the story’s characters. Once loaded, the narrative
fabric follows its way: there is a temporal and causal organization and
succession, power relationships change, tensions are resolved. In this
sense, when persons elect a story, they delegate some tensions and
some internal contents, let the narration transform them, and reincor-
porate them in a transformed, elaborated way. Thus, the transforma-
tional dynamics inherent to a time-oriented symbolic resource can
allow, in turn, a transformation of the contents deposed by the persons
(Green, 1969, 1973/1992a, 1992b; Kaës, 1996; Ricoeur, 1985/1988). This
reshaping is made in a culturally shared form, and the rules that struc-
ture these conflicts are socially and culturally acknowledged (Kaës,
1998). Here, we may say that this woman used the ‘narrativization’
function of a symbolic resource, which allows a developmental process
to happen—conflicts do not prevent her from representing herself as
mother and the coming child.
In contrast to this example, I will consider the mother of Celine.
Here, the mentioned and chosen names are not explicitly related to
identity dimensions, but these refer to French history (Manon, Marion)
and French songs. This woman does not articulate questions related to
lines or cultural transmission, although she mentions that her relation-
ship to her stepfamily is conflictual. In contrast with the former case,
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the discourse is difficult to follow, with brutal topic changes and high
contrasts between cold and emotionally invested parts. There are
neither representations of the child in the future, nor evocations of
images of the young woman as a mother. The mother mentions two
important cultural elements: the song from which her daughter’s name
comes, and which she used to sing in holiday camps as a teenager and
her passion for French history.
The main problems she appears to have to deal with refer to her
separation from her mother. She explains having grown up without a
father, and thus having been close to her mother. She married her
husband young, to create her own family, and to gain some distance
from her mother. However, although her early motherhood seems to
concretize such an attempt, some indices in her discourse and other
expressions suggest that the separation is not achieved, or, at least, that
there is some confusion about the nature and the depth of this link.
Hence, in her discourse, the woman makes pronoun confusions when
referring to herself and/or her mother; she replicates her mother’s way
of naming a child (choosing a name long before meeting her husband);
the baby’s name is similar to her own; she justifies her passion for
history by the fact that her mother has introduced her to it, using
strong verbs such as having been ‘bifurcated’ into it, and being
‘hooked’ in it—as one could be hooked in an addiction. She thus seems
to want to cut her link to her mother, without being able to extricate
herself.
When asked about novels she likes, she mentions Angelique, a
romantic historical novel, and de Buron’s books—she doesn’t mention
any plot or narrative elements. She mentions a character, jumps to
questions related to her mother, and speaks about the ‘universe’
created by these stories; the narrative universe and her real life are
entwined. For instance, the same sentence switches from her admira-
tion for the novel’s character of the King, to the real Château de
Versailles, which she once visited, and that period’s dresses; the
importance she gives to clothes and decor is strong enough to justify
her religious marriage in the beautiful church and dress.
In a psychoanalytical perspective, two very basic mental gestures
deeply related to the first psychic and interpersonal experiences are
conditions for emotions and experience to be ‘mentally graspable’
(Bruner, 1966; Piaget, 1937/1954; Tisseron, 1994; Winnicott, 1971/2001).
‘Containing’ abilities find their origin in the experience of one’s own
bodily skin-limits. The sense of containing is fundamental both to hold
some ideas in mind, and to keep an inner sense of consistency and
integrity. ‘Transformation’ abilities are related to the first experiences
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of having an effect on the world or the world having an effect on us.
They are the basis of all causal, associative, further psychic transfor-
mational experiences and actions. Difficulties in containing can be
problematic in later life. Nevertheless, cultural experience can precisely
contribute to the reinforcement of such abilities (Tisseron, 1990, 1995,
1999): for instance, looking at the same picture again and again allows
one to make the experience of a very structured, containing space,
which stays there in its fixity; one’s eyes and emotional-cognitive
experiences during reading are contained by its surface and its frame.
Transformation of an indigestible separation can progressively be
achieved through playing again and again with the scarf of a lost loved
one. This manipulation both helps the progressive re-introjection of the
emotional weight of the loss excorporated on the scarf, and reinforces
the inner abilities to transform (without this ‘external’ help). Similarly,
the strange experience of waiting for a child can be facilitated by the
name choice procedure when young parents find indirect ways to
contain and manipulate ideas and emotions attached to the (unthink-
able) coming child, such as active consultations of books, web-page
surfing, construction and deconstruction of lists, preparation of fictive
announcement cards—trying, playing with names and possibilities,
investing and rejecting possible names (Zittoun, 2001b). Transforma-
tional activities reinforce mental schemes and the assimilation of
experience with its emotional and unconscious prolongations.
Let us return to the example. Here, it is harder to see on what
grounds the mother finds a ‘resonance’ with the cultural elements.
Nevertheless, there is an emotional proximity to the history of
France—through the mother’s passion—and an emotional nostalgic
attachment to the song, designating memories of adolescent groups
and togetherness. It may be that the heroes of the novels are associated
with the mother and the women herself; and stories about royal lines
are related to intergenerational and gender relationships. This young
woman’s uses of symbolic resource can be understood at two levels.
First, the universe of the history of France—rooms, clothes—seems to
offer a ‘containing’ world, an emotional, almost maternal consolation;
here, unlike in the first example, boundaries between reality and fiction
are blurred. Second, the words of the song represent a person asking
an older woman why she never remarried, affirming that she will not
be forgotten, and finishing with ‘we will stay with you’. If we compare
these words with the woman’s situation, some resemblances appear:
in that song, as it is the case for her, it is really hard to leave a lonely
older person—one’s own, unmarried mother—to go and live a life
on one’s own. It seems that this song strongly echoes the refused
20
dependency of this woman on her mother, as appears in her discourse
and in the cultural choices. However, she seems unaware of the
meaning of this song, designated by the baby’s first name. I propose to
consider that this symbolic resource—the song—has here acquired a
‘deposit’ function: a complex, difficult to contemplate, heavily
emotionally loaded problem of the mother–adult daughter relationship
seems to be deposited in the first name, safely attached to the baby, so
as to wait until it will be possible to reflect upon it. Remaining
unthought, however, this problem diffuses within the person’s
discourse and actions.
Symbolic Competencies and Development
Our exploration of a specific transition period has shown that cultural
elements can be used as resources for developmental processes, at
the level of acquisition of skills and knowledge and for identity re-
elaboration and personal relocation, which are expressions of one’s
subjectivity. At another level, to understand how such changes ‘make
sense’ for the parents, we inferred some dynamics of the interiority,
and saw that symbolic resources can have a function in the contain-
ment, the transformation and the elaborations of unconscious emotions
and conflicts related to the transition.
I proposed that a transition period can be said to be developmental
when the person constructs means allowing her to acknowledge in
some proportion the new realities and to deal with these without
causing alienation or suffering. I suggested that, in the case of the tran-
sition to parenthood, such an outcome should imply the elaboration
of representation of oneself as possible parent and of the coming child.
As illustrated in two examples, the analysis of the data revealed
different outcomes of such transitions. Some parents develop clear
representations of themselves in the future, engage in learning and
relocation processes, try to confer meaning on the event and on the
life of the coming child, and modify their personal narratives. In their
discourse, unconscious representations, emotions and conflicts related
to these experiences, though present as harmonic echoes of the
discourse related, barely invade. The transition period seems to be
used as an occasion of development. Some other parents seem less
able to do this; they develop less clear representations, have more
inconsistent views about their lives and the child, and struggle to
inscribe the events within a sense of continuity. Unconscious emotions
and ambivalences seem to unwillingly invade the discourse or are
absolutely banned.
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Different types of uses of symbolic resources seem to generally accom-
pany with these more or less developmental conclusions of the tran-
sition. On one side, two main types of uses of symbolic resource seem to
allow persons to elaborate emotions and conflicts, to facilitate meaning
construction, and, hence, seem developmental. One is the use of cultural
elements for a complex narrativization function, as shown earlier; in the
transition to parenthood, historical novels, quasi-mythological narra-
tives, the Bible, classic movies such as family sagas, were used for
such functions. They allow the expression and the symbolization of
representations and emotions, and might have a transformative effect
on them (Segal, 1991; Vygotsky, 1928/1971). Another developmental
use is given by a metaphorization function. Different types of stories and
narratives furnish metaphors, and cultural practices and rites, religious
habits, familial traditions and professional bodies of practices offer
similar resources. For instance, a woman uses her knowledge of the
fabrication of a wine as a metaphor allowing her to think about her
pregnancy and the part played by unpredictability in the result of a
long construction process. This allows her to ‘map’ unrelated fields, to
enrich the fields with the other’s meanings and to generate new associ-
ations (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ricoeur, 1976). On the
other side, some uses of cultural elements lead instead to the isolation
of some conflicts and ambivalent emotions, or to the prevention of their
elaboration. In that sense, such uses are not directly developmental,
although they can contribute to further elaborations. Here, we have
seen the use of the containing function of a cultural element, such as the
use of the French history, and the use of its deposit function, such as the
function of a song mentioned earlier. Any image or part of a cultural
element or its memory can have such functions.
The question is therefore to understand why some people use the
developmental functions of cultural elements, such as narrativization
and metaphorization, and others use the containing and deposit func-
tions. More or less ‘developmental’ uses of symbolic resources are not
strictly related to the type of cultural elements, but to one’s potential
psychic abilities to deal with some problems; different persons can
refer to the same cultural narrative and use it in different functions. It
is nevertheless the case that some cultural elements are more likely to
be useful for persons when they are closer to the thematic that preoccu-
pies a person (Zittoun, 2001b), or when some socio-cultural common-
alities facilitate one’s resonance with an element, or, finally, when the
cultural element has a more or less complex way to apprehend a
specific problematic—including its complexities and variations, and
references to a social and cultural order.
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Elsewhere, we have explored the social and symbolic constraints that
might be exerted upon a person’s uses of symbolic resources (Zittoun
et al., 2003). In this paper, I propose to examine the ‘abilities’ to use
symbolic resources, for better or for worse in terms of developmental
outcomes. I will call symbolic competencies that which might allow
developmental uses of symbolic resources.
Proposing an additional notion, I am aware of defying any Occamian
decency. However, my attempt is justified here by the need to account
for the empirical evidences discussed, as they emerge out of a change
of metaphor in our apprehension of symbolic dynamics. This being
said, let us consider the exploratory notion of symbolic competencies
to designate the group of skills allowing ‘developmental’ uses of
symbolic resources—uses that allow symbolic elaboration rather than
mere emotional containing or just task-solving (i.e. naming a child).
Drawing upon developmental literature, I will attempt to identify
some of the sub-abilities that symbolic competencies might encompass.
First, they involve skills connected to the decoding of symbolic
language—understanding texts or graphic forms; and forms of ‘media
literacy’ (knowledge of genres, classical plots or forms, etc.), enabling
to construct the intended meaning. Second, recent studies suggest that
they include sub-abilities such as maintaining the distinction between
reality and imagination, and mental ‘containing’; this also includes an
ability to use a symbol in a reflective way—as a means to reflect upon
one’s own states of mind. These reflective abilities are themselves the
result of the internalization of early symbolically mediated interactions
(Nelson, 2002). These elementary mental movements of containing and
reflectivity constitute what has been called a ‘mentalization’ ability
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002), and seems to designate
phenomena of micro-semiotic regulations of affects (Valsiner, 2001).
But then, if one can thus enter a world of imagination, a third set of
operations is needed to link a symbolic reality, imaginary worlds or
worlds of ‘what-ifs’, with a given real one (Segal, 1991)—which
includes analogic or metaphoric abilities, knowledge transfer, and so
on (Gardner & Wolf, 1983; Marton & Säljö, 1997; Salomon, 1979).
Fourth, these links between a given ‘fictional’ world and one’s own
experience in the real world can be experienced in an unaware way,
can be acknowledged by a person, can be looked for, or can even be
searched for with expertise regarding what element might be useful in
what situation. We can thus also expect more or less reflectivity on
one’s uses of symbolic resources (Zittoun et al., 2003). A person can
know that she feels blurred after a disconcerting novel, a person can
be looking for a ‘feel-good’ movie on a sad day, or a person can be
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looking for a given passage of his favourite text that might help him to
grasp an issue he is dealing with (Zittoun, 2003a). In every case, the
person is engaged in intentional actions, and has a given aim; all three
cases can mediate changes—even if the ‘developmental’ aim is
intended only in the third, where the use of the symbolic resources is
deliberate and implies a reflective look on its outcomes. In sum, on this
basis, symbolic competencies might be said to include familiarity in a
particular symbolic language or form, an ability to use its semiotic
components to contain and reflect upon emotions these might regulate,
an ability to link possible worlds to real worlds, and, finally, a meta-
ability to reflect these steps, so as to direct or anticipate them.
The notion of ‘symbolic competencies’ proposes a new perspective
on the person’s uses of symbolic resources in transitions, in their
everyday social and cultural locations. It designates a set of complex
skills and abilities, allowing a person to use cultural elements as
resources for symbolic elaboration, required for any further meaning
elaboration, identity transformation, construction of new understand-
ings or acquisition of skills required for these transitions.
As suggested in this paper, examining the uses of symbolic resources
and symbolic competencies implies overcoming established theoretical
divisions between rational and narrative thinking, cognitive and
emotional processes, conscious and unconscious experiences. The
study of symbolic competencies might thus contribute to conceptual-
izing symbolic thinking in adult life (Labouvie-Vief, 1992). Finally,
symbolic competencies can be encouraged and trained, and, when
acquired, can play an important role in psychological development
(Tisseron, 2000; Wolf & Heath, 1992; Zittoun, 1996, 2001a). They may
indeed allow a person to use cultural elements available within given
socio-cultural constraints, in order to deepen his or her grasp and
involvement in his or her life, and his or her ability to resist some other
cultural elements—such as becoming critical toward some media. In
sum, having looked at processes of changes from the perspective
emerging from the metaphor of ‘uses of symbolic resources’, I suggest
that the notion of symbolic competencies might enrich our under-
standing of adolescent and adult psychological development.
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1. In an etymological sense, ‘intention’ comes from the Latin intendere;
between the 12th and the 15th century it takes meanings as different as
having one’s attention applied to, longing for, listening to, or
understanding something. One interesting meaning, from arcum intendere,
means to tense one’s bow, which evolves into ‘to have one’s
attention/mind tensed towards something’. From that, the notion of
intentio has in middle French a similar sense of ‘application, attention’,
eventually linked with ‘project, will, moral end’, and so on (Wartburg,
1928), therefore the idea of ‘to apply one’s mind to a given object’ 
(Y. Greub, personal communication, March 2002).
2. A quantitative analysis based on a clinical frame of discourse analysis
(Ammaniti, Candelori, Pola, & Tambelli, 1999; Ammaniti & Stern, 1991)
and sociological insights (Coenen-Huther, 1994) allowed the examination
of the relations between the parents’ awareness of transgenerational issues
and memories and their own capacity to work through the cognitive and
affective challenges related to this particular period. A variable ‘elaboration
of the transition’ is operationalized attributing the discourse to one of three
modalities (balanced–disinvested–emotionally overwhelmed) on the basis
of the balance between primary and secondary processes (Green, 1969,
1995/1997), and of clarity in the uses of pronouns, general consistency,
time orientation, etc. The relationship to transgenerational baggage and
memories is operationalized in four modalities: an awareness of that
received heritage, and the will to continue it (Continuity); the same
awareness with a will of rupture (Discontinuity); no awareness at all of
such questions (Anomy); the exhumation of lost cultural baggage, present
higher in the family tree, but not transmitted by the parents, for a
restoration of a transmission (Exhumation). Codifications have been
effectuated by three independent observers. Categories cannot be
explained by socio-educational factors.
3. It includes the following. First, there is a reconstruction of the present
transition period of the person, and of its relationship to his or her
biographical lines (Bar-On, 1995; Kohler Riessman, 1993; Rosenthal, 1993).
Second, there is a review of the cultural elements mentioned by the person,
and a close examination of the most relevant books, songs, movies, etc.
Third, there is an identification of the ‘conflicting knots’ in the discourse:
less elaborated problems related to the transition to parenthood. When not
explicitly mentioned, such ‘conflicting knots’ are indicated by changes of
emotional intensity by repetitions, contradictions, by cross-thematic
semantic fields, by phonologic recurrences (Ammaniti et al., 1999; Freud,
1900/1960a, 1901/1960b, 1905/1960c; Green, 1969, 1992b, 1995/1997;
Tisseron, 1990). Identifying these knots does not mean to attempt explaining
them (which would imply a real clinical work). Fourth, this interpretative
analysis includes a parallel reading of the personal story with its non-
elaborated questions and the mentioned cultural elements, both in their
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presentation by the person and in my own reading. This finally allows
inferring whether, and how, the symbolic resource has been used by
the person.
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